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On thè Idea of Reflexive Rhetoric in Homer
Mari Lee Mifsud
For Henry W.Johnstone,Jr.
WhenOdysseus, disguisedas a beggar,sees his handmaidensflirtingwith
the suitors,he délibérâtesabouthow to punish their unfaithfulness{Od.
20.9-21). He is tempted to spring on them and kill each one. But he
reasonsthatsince the combinationof enduranceandcunningintelligence
allowed him to escape the cave of the Cyclops, at a time when he suffered
worse, it is likely to work in his présentsituation. He chooses to endure.
When HenryJohnstoneand I translatedthis passage, we wonderedto
whatextent we could say thatOdysseuspersuades himself to endure. Is
Odysseusinvolved in self-persuasion,whatJohnstonehas termedreflexive rhetoric,when he délibérâtes? Answeringthis question led us to explore relatedquestionssuch as, does Odysseus hâve a "self to which his
délibération/persuasioncan be addressed? If so, how do we know that
Odysseus actuallypersuades himself when he délibérâtes? If Odysseus
does persuadehimself, can we say he practicesrhetoricon himself? Can
we even talkof rhetoricin Homer? Throughthis essay, I wish to shareat least in part- our explorationof thèse questions. In particular,I address how Johnstone'sidea of the rhetoricalwedge moves us towardthe
idea of a reflexive rhetoricin Homer,a rhetoricin which Odysseus seems
to be involved in his variousdélibérations.
I focus on Odysseus's délibérationin the Odyssey, since his is the
Homericarchetype,and since the Odysseyis the text thatJohnstoneand I
have been enamoredwith since late fall of 1993.1 Fourscènes in particular are explicit, complete portrayals of Odyssean délibération: (1)
Odysseusdélibérâtesaboutwhetherto obey the goddess Leukothea'sinstructions(5.355-64); (2) He délibérâtesabout how best to approach
Nausikaa(6. 141-48); (3) He délibérâtesabouthow to approachhis fight
with Iros (18.90-94); And (4) he délibérâtesabout how to punish his
handmaidens (20.9-11). In all four of thèse scènes, the process of
Odysseus's délibérationis the same. He becomes awareof a problemobeying Leukothea,approachingNausikaa,fighting Iros, and punishing
- and then he générâtesalternativeapproachesto these
his handmaidens
Problems.Should he take Leukothea'smagie veil or stay on his raft as
Philosophyand Rhetoric,Vol. 31, No. 1, 1998. Copyright© 1998 The PennsylvaniaState
University,UniversityPark,PA.
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long as possible and find his own way to shore? Should he, naked and
filthy from the sea, clasp Nausikaa'sknees or beseech her from behind
the brush?Should he fìght to kill Iros or only to wound him? Should he
kill the handmaidensin the heat of the momentor enduretheirbehavior?
Finally,he announcesa reasonfor his choice. He will remainon his raft
because Leukotheamay be tryingto trickhim andbecause land is too far
away to abandonit yet. He will persuadeNausikaafrombehindthe brush
so that he won't anger her. He will only wound Iros so that he will not
raise suspicions about his own identity. He will endurethe behaviorof
his handmaidensto wait for a moreopportunemomentand a more strategie plan.
In light of thèse four explicit and complete scènes of délibération,the
question arises, does Odysseus's délibération proceed as an internai
suasory discourse? When he recognizes a problem before him, poses
alternativefutureactions to himself as potentialresponses,and makes a
choice among them based on a certainreason, has Odysseus persuaded
himself?
Problemsarise with an affirmativeresponse. Most obvious is the suggestion thatOdysseushas a "self thatcan be persuaded.This suggestion
raises questions among critics such as Bruno Snell who deny the existence of self-awarenessin Homericcharacters.Snell arguesthatno single,
identifiableword for "self exists in the Homericepics (1953, 8). Words
and
thatmightlook like équivalentsfor "self,"such as ,
,
,
are not. Instead,they denote only the inner partsof the Homeric
,
person,which are analogousto organswith no unifying principleto render them cohérent (8-9).2 The problem posed by Snell is this: The
Homericpersondoes not deliberate,and thereforecould not be involved
in a process of self-persuasion,because the Homericpersonhas no consciousness of a single self to which délibération/persuasion
could be addressed. Snell's problem arises from lexical grounds:the absence of a
single word for the self thatwould markthe Homericidea of the self.
One way to respondto the Snellian hypothesismight be to posit lexical évidence of self-awareness(Sullivan 1988, Claus 1981, Jahn 1987).
HomericGreekhas a first-personformof activeandmiddle/passiveverbs,
and it has reflexive pronouns. Both of these featuresshow thata person
distinguishedhis/her expériences from those of another. Homeric individualsused personalpronounsas well. This reflects a notionof personal
identity,an awarenessof one's separatenessfromothers. But, as Johnstone
has written,/ denotes a person, not a self (1970, 110). Perhapswe can
posit more complex or significant lexical évidence. For example, the

This content downloaded from 141.166.177.91 on Wed, 2 Apr 2014 15:40:39 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

REFLEXIVERHETORICIN HOMER

43

oblique cases of
suggest the person as agent. Many of the Homeric
wordsin the "soul/self ' semanticrangeseem to be interchangeable,used
pleonasticallyfor poetic purposes,hence revealingan implicitunity(Jahn
1987). Furthermore,the HomericGreekcase Systemincludes thè accusative of respect,which indicatesthata personis awareof being affected
as a whole as well as within a particularpart (Sullivan 1988, 6).
Positingeven this kindof lexical évidence fails to résolve the Snellian
problem,thoughit certainlyseems to corneclose to doing so. Ultimately,
it fails becauseit fails to questionthe assumptionthata culturemusthave
a word for a thing in orderto recognize that thing's existence. It seems
entirelypossible that a culturecould operateconsciously priorto its inventionof a Systemof names for the variousopérationsin which they are
involved (Gaskin 1990, Knox 1993, Sharples1983). To argueotherwise
would lead to the conclusion that those cultures guided by a Systemof
abstractlanguagearethe only culturesto operatein conscious ways. This
argumentprésupposesthat only one form of consciousness counts- the
consciousness thatanses from an abstractvocabulary. The implications
alone of this argumentseem to provide groundsenough upon which to
rejectit. Moreover,as Johnstoneonce remarkedto me, arewe to believe,
accordingto the Snellian approachto humanconsciousness, thatpeople
didn'thave egos priorto Freudcalling themegos? Orthatthe Esquimaux
do not know snow because they have no one word for it?
Johnstone'squestionshighlightfor us the snareof the lexical method,
namely,thatconsciousness of a particularphenomenoncan exist priorto
its being named. While the abstractionof a name may allow us to think
differentlyabout a given phenomenon,it does not necessarily markthe
origin of consciousness aboutthatphenomenon. Naming présupposesa
level of awareness;it does not create awarenessfrom scratch. It seems
quite possible that Homercould communicatea unity in multiplicityin a
way thatthe intellectualculturein which Snell opérâtescould not. While
Snell mightbe able to say thathe would be fragmentedand schizoidif he
didn't operatewithin a languageSystemthat could providehim with the
wordself, this does not meanthatpeople in the Homericpoems were portrayedas fragmentedandschizoidbecauseHomerdidn'thavea wordforthe
se//(Padel 1992,44-48). This is not to say thatconsciousness(Homericor
otherwise)exists priorto language,butonly to say thatconsciousnessis not
of a single,
exclusivelydépendenton anabstractlanguageliketheabstraction
identifiablenamefor a particularconceptor phenomenon.
Odysseus's self may not be manifest lexically, but it doesn't have to
be. It is manifest operationally- throughthe very process of his délibération. Atthisjuncture, Johnstone'sworktakes hold. As Johnstonehas
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theorized, thè self émerges from a problem giving rise to délibération
(1970).
Odysseus délibérâtes because a situation has arisen in which his mind
is torn in two. In the Homeric formula "
(torn asunder, he
"asunder," not ,
délibérâtes),"3 the Controlling word is ,
"deliberate," since it is the former that makes the latter possible (13 September 1994).4 Odysseus's mind is sundered when Leukothea tempts
him with the magie veil, when he must approach Nausikaa, when he must
fìght Iros, and when he sees his handmaidens. When Odysseus begins to
deliberate, he reveals his own récognition of this sundering as problematic. He could not recognize this sundering from a fragmented perspective, but only from the unity of the seif. Johnstone explains that, from the
sundered mind, the self émerges as the point of view including both (or
ali) poles of the sundering (15 September 1994). Hence, the self "sees"or, in other words, the person's attention is called to- the sundering. This
sight poses a contradiction for the person, what Carroll Arnold has called
the "paradoxical pair of awarenesses" (Arnold 1987, 121). The paradox
becomes a bürden for the person who realizes that s/he cannot be both
poles. Délibération occurs precisely to respect the sundering, and it serves
to unburden the self from the tension of contradiction. The incentive to
deliberate arises when one realizes that one must choose.
In this way we can see how Odysseus's sundering and resulting délibération make manifest his self. Délibération présupposes self-consciousness of the necessity to make a choice. In this perspective, we can also
see the emerging relationship between délibération and persuasion.5
In Johnstone's view, if to be persuaded means to be made conscious of
an object or thesis, then we can cali the coming of consciousness of the
necessity to deliberate self-persuasion (14 September 1994). Hence, délibération results from self-persuasion. But can we really say that persuasion has occurred prior to the application of a deliberative calculus?
One might argue that it is a deliberative calculus that allows Odysseus to
generate alternative courses of action and to choose among them for the
most fìtting response to his problem. When Odysseus décides that he
will only wound Iros to prevent raising suspicions about his own identity,
he générâtes in himself a reason to believe - a logos, if you will - why
this is better than killing him. He délibérâtes about his future action and
arrives at a choice reasoned through a calculus. This logos might be said
to persuade him into making the choice he makes. Therein, one might
say, Odysseus persuades himself through the use of a deliberative calculus, and in this way délibération and persuasion are related.
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If this is the essential link between délibération and persuasion, namely,
thè use of a deliberative calculus, then can we say Odysseus persuaded
himself even in the absence of such a calculus? The majority of Homeric
délibération scènes contain no deliberative calculi.6 For example, when
Odysseus lands on thè shore of Scheda, he gives no reason why he chooses
to sleep in the woods rather than on the beach (5.465-87). The lack of a
deliberative calculus might make Odysseus's action seem arbitraryrather
than deliberate.
One approach to this problem would be to generalize from the scènes
where Odysseus uses deliberative calculi to those where he does not. We
could say that in thèse latter scènes the calculi are implicit. This seems
reasonable, since we know Homer is a poet of action, not of thought. For
poetic purposes, Homer does not always elaborate thought, though he
does provide enough évidence of it to warrant a generai description of
Odysseus as deliberate, even in the absence of a calculus.
Even if we can affirm that deliberative calculi can be implicit, still we
hâve not established whether thè use of a deliberative calculus is the essential bridge between délibération and persuasion. To re-address the issue,
Johnstone asks, if we believe délibération and persuasion to be linked primarily by thè use of deliberative calculi, then are we committed to believe,
for example, that Big Blue persuaded itself when it made moves against
Gary Kasparov (20 May 1997 and 28 May 1997)? Johnstone explains that
Big Blue's program is said to be heuristic, "At any given point in a game, it
surveys the possibilities and chooses the one that seems best. This is in
effect no more than what a human player can do" (28 May 1997).
The question of whether Big Blue persuades itself can be generalized
to the question of whether nonhumans communicate. This is one of the
questions exercising George Kennedy in "A Hoot in the Dark" (1992).
Kennedy argues that the communication présent in nature shows signs of
rhetorical energy. Johnstone, like Kennedy, notes, "There is clearly a
sensé in which bées use language. Their dances communicate the whereabouts of nectar. The sensé of 'communicate' hère is the same as that in
which machines 'communicate' with one another. A radar beacon can
communicate to the computer of an airplane the whereabouts of an airport" (1988, 128).
Johnstone, though, stops short of identifying the nonhuman and human sensés of communicate in the way that Kennedy does. He contends
that when one collapses the distinction between thèse two sensés of communicate, one fails to question the assumption that communication is primarily a kind of compétence. If we understand communication primarily
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as a compétence, then we must believe that animal communication and
machine communication are fundamentally similar to human communication. And we must capitulate to thè idea that machines could be more
perfect communicators than humans (1988, 128). For Johnstone, though,
human communication is unique and exists on a level différent from that
of bées or chess-playing machines. For Johnstone, communication is a
consciousness, not a compétence.
Big Blue is not conscious. Because of thè continuity between its input
and its output, Big Blue can ne ver stand apart from its data. It can ne ver
take account of thèse data as objects. One might argue, though, that data
hâve to be transmitted to and outputted from a computer via interfaces,
one where data are transformed into electrical impulses, and one where
thè output is printed as information. But Johnstone rejects thèse "interfaces" as real interfaces because no gap exists between the data fed to the
machine as input and the machine itself, and again between the machine
and the information available as output on the printed page (1996a, 3-5).
The input and output are two forms of energy belonging to the same system. A computer cannot take on a perspective other than its input and its
output. That the computer translates input into output is an inévitable
resuit of its having been inputted, the inevitability coming into question
only on the occasion of a mechanical breakdown.
Délibération means thè act of being deliberate, and to be deliberate is
to be conscious of the freedom to make choices. This freedom is unavailable to Big Blue. Big Blue does not freely enter thè game. And because
Big Blue is ne ver free to stand against its input or its output, it ne ver faces
any temptation in the course of its calculations. Whereas we can conceive of Kasparov going through a rigorous calculation, surveying the
choices and selecting one that seems best for any possible move, we can
also conceive of him being tempted to act in a way inconsistent with the
results of his calculation. Or he might be tempted to quit thè game. The
coming of either temptation would cali for him either to resist it or to
yield to it, both of which would require délibération. Big Blue can never
face such a temptation or involve itself in the délibération required for
one to resist or yield to a particular temptation. It cannot stand against its
data. It is not free. It has no incentive.
Unlike Big Blue, Odysseus is free and motivated. And he does face
temptation. He is tempted toacceptLeukothea's magie veil. He is tempted
to clasp Nausikaa's knees. He is tempted to kill Iros and his handmaidens.
Odysseus expériences temptation because he is aware of the possibility
of doing something other than what cornes automatically or impulsively.
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Odysseus has perspectiveon his expérience. Only with perspectivecan
one say "Iam temptedto do that"withoutsimply doing whatcomes naturally, in other words, without always acting as a slave to impulse. The
incentive to deliberatedoes not arise in a person (or machine) who fails
to recognize him/herselfas fundamentallyfree. This récognitionforces
an interruptionof thè unity of the transactionbetween subjectand object
(Johnstone1978, 131). Such an interruptionallows Odysseus to stand
apartfrom his expérienceto observe it.
The deliberativecalculus cannot be thè essential link between délibérationand persuasion,thoughit undoubtedlyfigures into the process of
self-persuasionto the extent that it either explicitly or implicitly brings
about a particular décision. This moment of particulardécision is certainly a momentof self-persuasion. But it seems thatin Johnstone'sperspective, when one suddenlysees that one must choose, in other words,
when one arrivesat thè generai décision to decide, self-persuasionhas
alreadyoccurred;it does not lie in the calculus that yields the décision.
Johnstonewrites, "The calculus that ensues after the soul is 'split asunder' is not itself an act of persuasion,and is persuasiveonly in the way in
which thè results of any calculationare persuasive. But the use of this
calculusprésupposesthe self-persuasionentailedin the acknowledgment
thatthereis a problemrequiringdélibération"(14 September1994). The
essential moment that makes délibérationself-persuasionis priorto the
use of a deliberativecalculus- it is the very momentof consciousness of
thè necessity to deliberate.
In this perspective,the fact that Homer is frequentlysilent about deliberativecalculi is irrelevantto the question of whetherOdysseus persuadeshimself. Johnstonewrites, "Justas the primetactic of persuasion
is to let the audience draw its own conclusions - is, therefore,
enthymematic- so the self-persuasionthat makes one see that there is a
problemputs one in the position to reach one's own conclusions about
coping with the problem"(14 September1994).
Since délibérationsignais that an agent is conscious of a problemat
hand, and is awareof the necessity to résolve this problemthrough(inner) speech, délibération,like persuasion,présupposesa Bitzerian"rhetorical situation." But délibération,like persuasion,présupposessomethingeven morefundamentalthanthe rhetoricalsituation- the rhetorical
wedge. It is this wedge thatevokes one's consciousness both of a problem and of the potentialto résolve the problemthroughspeech, whether
in public assembly or throughinnerdebate. For Johnstone,it is the very
functionof rhetoricto cali attentionto a situationfor which objectivityis
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claimed: "If rhetoric is an art of persuasion, it practices this art by soliciting attention. ... A stimulus that directly excites a reflex, never emerging as an object of consciousness, is irrelevant to rhetorical transactions"
(1990, 334).7
In the absence of the rhetorical wedge, no medium can be opened between consciousness and its object, whether this consciousness is manifest publicly in open forum or personally in inner debates. Johnstone
notes Aristotle's message to Democritus, that in the absence of a medium
we could see nothing at all (1996a, 2). Sight présupposes ,
or an
"in-between," what Johnstone has sometimes called an interface (1996a,
2; 1982, 95-102; 1970, 122-31). We could not, for example, see an object placed directly on the eye. Johnstone writes, "Language, thè medium of communication, likewise must separate the message from its récipient. Otherwise it would be as if we had opened a person's skull and
simply placed the information on his/her brain, as one might place an
object on someone's eye" (1996a, 2). Bee communication and computer
communication work this way. But in human communication, information does not pass directly from its source to thè Storage facilities of the
receiver (1996a, 5-6). And in human délibération, the unity between
impulse and action is interrupted.
The visionary nature of Johnstone's rhetorical wedge allows us to see
that it opérâtes both from the outside and from within. To the extent that
rhetoric, as Johnstone conceives it, functions to evoke consciousness - to
attack unawareness - we can say that rhetoric evokes consciousness not
only in other people, but also in oneself. Johnstone writes, "Public persuasion attempts to drive this wedge between the audience and some fact
or thesis of which it has hitherto been unconscious; délibération (= selfpersuasion) drives it between a subject no longer unconscious of the choice
s/he must make and him/herself; it brings the choice to consciousness"
(13 September 1994).
In his extension of rhetoric to a private sphère, Johnstone accounts for
its reflexivity, a phenomenon that he himself admits has not generally
been recognized (1970, 125). He contends that what invites thè interpretative act need not be external to the interpréter. "When rhetoric is capable of flowing in two directions, it can flow both from me and to me. I
can, in other words, be my own audience. I can drive the wedge between
stimulus and sensation that is required to evoke my own consciousness"
(1990, 337).
When Odysseus asks himself whether he should kill his handmaidens
or endure their behavior, he thwarts the stimulus-response behavior that
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primarily characterizes nonrhetorical communication. He drives a wedge
between stimulus and sensation, a wedge that makes apparent his own
consciousness of the freedom to make a choice about how he wants to
respond to the stimulus. He makes a generai décision to decide. And
when he arrives at a particular décision regarding his future action, he
again has moved himself through speech.
So, in this way, we can say Odysseus is engaged in a reflexive rhetoric
when he délibérâtes. But can we speak of rhetoric in Homer, let alone of
a kind other than suasory discourse in the public sphère? Is persuasion in
Homer an art that we can cali rhetoric? Furthermore, is self-persuasion
portrayed as an art by Homer? Again, Johnstone's work moves us toward
thè idea of a reflexive rhetoric in Homer (1996b).
The idea of Homeric rhetoric is alleged to pose the problem of anachronism.8 These allégations hold that because no word rhetorikê exists in
the poems, and because certain linguistic advances had not yet been made,
like the invention of a philosophical vocabulary, rhetoric does not exist in
the poems. Persuasion, then, appears to be only a knack, a random or
arbitrary act, or a gift of thè gods, rather than a systematic art.
One way to respond to thèse allégations is to show that the existence
of the term rhetorikê, like the existence of a philosophical vocabulary, is
irrelevant to the question of whether an art of persuasion existed in Homer.
The same argument raised against the Snellian hypothesis is raised again.
Johnstone writes, "My own view is that whether rhetorikê or (following a
point made by Poulakos) oblique cases of this word (not just the nominative, but thè genitive, dative, or accusative) occur before Piato is irrelevant to the question whether rhetoric as a discipline occurred before
Piato. It is not altogether absurd to suppose that rhetoric was a recognized verbal art even in the time of Homer, even though no case of the
noun rhetorikê occurs in Homer" (1996b, 438).
For Johnstone, answering whether rhetoric exists in Homer dépends
on how we define it (1996b, 439). We might want to defìne rhetoric in a
way that separates it from the practice of persuasion. Rhetoric then becomes armchair persuasion and opérâtes as the analy sis or theorization of
persuasion and not the act itself. But we don't have to define it this way.9
In fact, we usually don't. Johnstone notes that when we talk about Newt
Gingrich's rhetoric, we are not making références to his rhetorical theory.
As Johnstone suggests, if we define rhetoric as the art of persuasion, where
theory and practice are inextricably linked, then, to answer the question
of whether rhetoric exists in Homer, we would need to explore only
whether anything in the poems suggests that persuasion is in fact an art.
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say that rhetoric is an art of persuasion is to say that persuasive
practice has been acquired by some kind of method, as opposed to its
being a mere knack. But it does not follow from this that the method
discovered/applied has to be Aristotelian. It is very likely that people in
the Dark Ages had their own understanding of a method for acquiring and
practicing persuasion. Kennedy suggests that a Homeric awareness of
rhetoric was nurtured by the method of listening to older speakers and
acquiring formulae, thèmes, maxims, and stock topics such as myths and
historical examples (1963, 36; see also Donlan, 5 November 1988, 1-4).
Regardless of how Homeric people were habituated in persuasion, we
know that they were. Homer tells us so in the often-cited passage at Iliad
9.443. Phoenix describes his responsibilities as tutor to Achilles: to teach
Achilles to be a speaker ()
of speeches and a doer of
()
deeds. Speaking effectively in the assembly and fighting bravely in war
seem to be regarded as equally teachable. In addition to this, at Odyssey 1.384- 85, after Telemachus has spoken boldly to the suitors, Antinous
him how to speak
responds that thè gods must hâve taught ()
in speech
in
éducation
That
the
are
involved
Telemachus's
effectively.
gods
does not undermine the claim that speech was considered to be taught,
but rather emphasizes the point that it must be if even thè gods must use
instructional means - as opposed to magie - to help humans become good
speakers. These seem to be the only explicit pièces of évidence that speech
was taught, and Homer never expands on how speech was taught. However, he probably didn't need to say anything more on the subject. His
silence may indicate that his audience already knew that the skills involved in hunting, fighting, speechmaking, and the like, were taught.10
To say any more would be unnecessary.
As additional évidence of an art of persuasion in Homer, the numerous
persuasive practices in the epics show a consciousness of the necessity of
persuasion, of inventing potentially persuasive sayables, and of critiquing the appropriateness of persuasive messages based on an awareness of
effective and ineffective speech: thè deliberative debates throughout the
Iliad and in book 2 of the Odyssey, Antenor's comparison of the speaking styles of Odysseus and Menelaus in Ilia d 3 (Naas 1995, 134),Priam's
persuasion of Achilles in Iliad 24 (Naas 1995, 134),11Helen's debate over
what to say to Telemachus and how to say it when she recognizes him as
Odysseus's son in Odyssey 4, and Menelaus's critique of Peisistratus's
speech in Odyssey 15. These scènes reveal a criticai awareness of language and its strategie uses and effects. They reveal not only speechmaking, but also criticism of speeches and inventional processes. Homeric
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speecheseven shareformalstructures,suggestingthatthey hâve a method
(Toohey 1994).
It seems likely thatHomericpersuasionwas an art,priorto the coining
of the termrhetorikêor the inventionof a philosophicalvocabulary.12As
Johnstonewrites, "Tospeakof rhetoricin Homeris no anachronism;it is
simply a way of saying what we want to say about Homer. He perhaps
didn't have the term, but we do. Having it, we can use it wherever it
applies"(January1996). And it appliesnot only to publicpersuasivepractices in Homer,but to privatepracticesas well.
In Homer,self-persuasion,like publicpersuasion,appearsto be an art,
a habituatedpractice. That the four explicit and complete Odysseandélibérationscènes proceedin the same way- namely,throughrecognizing
a problem,realizing alternativecourses of action, and making a choice
based on a reason(s)- suggests an existing methodof deliberating. But
morefundamentalthanthis, we know thatOdysseusis acquaintedwith an
artof self-persuasionbecauseof his abilityto resisttemptation:"Toresist
temptationrequiresa self-directedrhetoric,which is clearlyan artsince it
does not come naturally"(Johnstone,14 March1996). Furthermore,that
délibérationdoes not come naturallyis most evident in the example of
Telemachus. His nondeliberatecharacterin the early stages of the poem
beginsto transformwhenhe gainsexposureto deliberativemodeis.13While
HomerportraysTelemachusas Comingto consciousnessaboutthe necessity to deliberateand acquiringthè necessaryskills to deliberate,Homer
portraysOdysseus as a masterdeliberator,one who has not only recognized thè necessity to deliberate,but has masteredthe method.
These aresome of the ideason a reflexiverhetoricin HomerthatHenry
JohnstoneandI haveexplored. Ourexplorationcontinuesthough,not only
of the presuppositionsof délibération,but to
to sharpenour understanding
see how andto whateffect, by examiningthè idea of a reflexiverhetoricin
Homer,we diversifythe historicalandtheoreticalpatternof rhetoric.
Few, if any, would disagreethatpublic discoursetakes center stage in
rhetoric'shistoryandtheory. As a resuitof restrictingrhetoricto suasory
activity of thepublic sphère,a single patternfor rhetorichas been established. But we know that a great deal of sélection takes place to create
such a monological narrative(Nienkamp 1994, 9). We also know, as
KennethBurke has taughtus well, that sélection présupposesrejection.
And with rejectioncornes at least marginalization,if not domination.
By recordingand theorizingonly public rhetoricand ignoringprivate
rhetoric,the dominanthistoryandtheoryof rhetoricseems to operatein a
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suspiciouslyPlatonicdichotomyof thoughtandspeech,wherethè knowledge we see in thè mind's eye is différentfrom thè knowledge we hearin
human speech. In this dichotomy,only one form of knowledge is reliable, andit is not thè knowledgethatspeech produces. By accountingfor
a reflexive rhetoricin Homer,we startto dislodge thè stabilizednarrative
aboutrhetoricas a public thing and to diversify it in thè hope that something previously ignoredand negatedcan be attendedto and affìrmednamely,thè role of rhetoricin thè privatesphère,and thè unity of thought
and speech in thè beginningsof thè Westernrhetoricaltradition.
More than this, moving towardan account of reflexive rhetoric(not
just in Homer,but in generai) allows us to see in even greaterdétail thè
centralityof rhetoricto our humancondition. This seems to me thè very
heartof Johnstone'swritingon rhetoric. His workrevealsthatrhetoricis
not only thè artthatguides our public choices; it is thè artthatguides our
privatechoices as well. The possibility for enrichingour understanding
of ourprivateandpublic selves calls for an explorationof reflexive rhetoric. HenryJohnstonehas acknowledgedthis cali since at least 1970, and
he continues to respond to it with unprecedentedinsight. His work in
turn calls us to be students of this idea. And in Henry Johnstone,we
could have no betterteacher.
Departmentof Rhetoricand Public Address
WhitmanCollege
Notes
1. By focusing on thè Odyssey,I do not mean to suggest thatthè Iliad has fewer, or
less relevant,délibérationscènes. Nor do I meanto suggest, by focusing only on Odysseus,
that no othercharactersin thè Odyssey(or thè Iliad for that matter)deliberate.
2. For a récent Snellian account of thè fragmentedHomeric psychology, see Erbse
(1990).
3. See, e.g., 0</. 22.333; 16.73.
4. This référenceand thè otherslike it referto excerptsfromJohnstone'sdailyjournal. He wrote these excerpts in responseto our conversations.
5. Forotherswho commenton thè relationshipbetweendélibérationandpersuasion,
see Isocrates(Antidosis256-61), Burke(1969, 38-39), andPerelmanandOlbrechts-Tyteca
(1969, 4-41). Also, Burks(1970) writes on thè link betweendélibérationandpersuasionin
thè work of MauriceNatansonand HenryJohnstone,as well as thatof RichardWhately,I.
A. Richards,and CharlesStevenson. Yoos (1987) and Arnold (1987) addressJohnstone's
treatmentof thè relationshipbetweendélibérationandpersuasion.Finally,Nienkamp(1994)
provides a historicalsurvey of thè idea of internairhetoric.
6. 5.465-87; 10.151-55; 10.49-54; 24.235-40; 9.299-306; 9.316-18; 9.420-24;
11.229-30.
7. See also Johnstone(1987, 130).
8. See Cole ( 199 1), Schiappa( 199 1), andChristopherLyle Johnstone( 1996). Though
each hashis own nuancedrejectionof Homericrhetoric,ali threeseem to sharethèassumption
thatthè phenomenonof rhetoriccouldnot be knownpriorto thè coiningof thè termrhetorikê.
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9. Hudson's 1923 rejectionof the séparationof rhetoricand oratorycomes to mind:
"Inancientas in moderntimes it was found impossibleto divorcetheoryfrompractice.The
rhetoricianand the oratorwere one. . . . [Rhetoric]does not satisfy itself alone with the
finding of means of persuasion;it also includes the persuasivearrangementand présentation of the speaker'smaterial.Aproductof rhetoric,in this sense, then,is neitheran analysis
of some speech alreadymade, with a list of figures and tropes, nor an analysis of subject
upon which a speech is to be made, showing what means of persuasioncan be employed.
Ratherit is a speech, or some piece of persuasivediscourse,persuasivelypresented"(1965,
22-23).
10. We are told thatSkamandrioswas taughtto hunt(II . 5.5 1). Eurypyluswas taught
to heal wounds, as was Achilles (II. 11.832). Euphorboswas taughtwarfare(II. 16.811).
The bardDemodocus was taughtby Apollo (Od. 8.488), and the bardPhemios taughthimself (Od. 22.347). Antilochos was taughthorsemanship(II. 23.307), and the handmaidens
were taughttheir craft in housekeepingand caring for their mistress (Od. 22.422). Homer
tells us only once thateach of thèse arts was taught.Neitherdoes he repeatthat they were
taughtnot does he expand on how they were taught.Yet this does not negate the fact that
these practiceswere taughtin Homer;in fact, it might very well emphasizethe point.
11. Naas ( 1995, 133-34) notes these instancesof persuasion,but denies thatthè mere
use of persuasivetechniques,or the critiqueof them, in the case of Antenor,can be termed
rhetoric(134-39).
12. See Karp( 1977), who arguesfor an implicitrhetoricaltheoryin Homer,andDonlan
(5 November 1988), who argues that we should no longer prétend- against all évidence
and common sense- that rhetoricwas not fully an art at every stage in its long history,
includingthe Homericstage.
13. Atheneexplainsto Telemachushow to discernthe poles of his dilemmaso thathe
can deliberateproperly( 1.267-69; 1.287-97); Peisistratusshareswith Telemachusandothers his internaidebateover to whom he shouldpass the cup as an invitationto speak (3.4751); Nestor, in telling Telemachusthe tale of the TrojanWar,mentions innerdebate seven
times, makingit a thème (3.132; 3.151-52; 3.152; 3.166; 3.169; 3.194; 3.126-29).
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